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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and
through the Department of
Social Services, ex rel.
CATHY PARKER,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

]
;
]
]
;
i

Case No. 930583-CA

]i

Priority 15

v.
HARRY IRIZARRY,
Defendant/Appellee.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 782a-3(2)(h) and 78-45-10 (1993).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.

Whether equitable estoppel or laches should ever apply in

a paternity case to defeat the obligation of the biological parent
to pay child support for the period prior to the commencement of
the paternity action.
Standard of Review;

This is a question of law which this

court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial
court's determination.

Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P. 2d

1095 (Utah 1990) .
B.

Whether

the

trial

court's

findings

as

to

a

"representation" made by Cathy Parker to the biological father are
clearly erroneous.
Standard

of

Review:

To

attack

a

trial

court's

factual

findings, the appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of
1

the findings and then demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the findings, the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings or the findings are otherwise
clearly erroneous.

Schindler v. Schindlerf

776 P. 2d 84 (Utah

1989); Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a).
C. Whether the trial court's findings of fact were sufficient
to establish all the elements of equitable estoppel.
Standard of Review:

This is a question of law, which this

court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial
court's determination.

CECO Corporation v. Concrete Specialists,

Inc., 772 P.2d 967 (Utah 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A complaint to establish the paternity of Breanna and Brittany
Parker, born April 18, 1985, was filed by the State of Utah on
behalf of Cathy A. Parker on May 30, 1989 (R.2-8) and served on the
defendant June 16, 1989.

(R.16-17).

A stipulation and agreement

acknowledging Harry D. Irizarry as the father of Breanna and
Brittany Parker was signed on or about July 10, 1990 (R.105-106),
and a Judgement and Order based on Stipulation was entered by the
court on August 17, 1990.

(R.103-104).

A motion for temporary

child support was filed by counsel for Cathy A. Parker on August
14, 1990.

(R.86-87).

A hearing was held regarding temporary

support on September 4, 1990, (R. 91-92) at which time Harry
Irizarry was ordered to pay $207.72 per month for the support of
the minor children in this action.

(R.192).

The Order on Ms.

Parker's Motion for Temporary Child Support was entered October 22,
2

1990.

(R.248).
A trial was held on February 10, 1993, the Honorable David

Roth, presiding pro tern (R.361), at which the primary issue was Mr.
Irizarry's obligation to pay child support during the four years
prior to the commencement of the paternity action.
issued from the bench on February 11, 1993.

A decision was

(R.362).

Proposed

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgement were submitted
to the Court by counsel for Mr. Irizarry.

Counsel for the State of

Utah objected and alternatives were submitted with the objection.
(R.375-394). Counsel for Harry Irizarry filed Defendant's Response
to Plaintiff State of Utah's Objection to Proposed Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgement.

(R.395-401).

Judge Tyrone

Medley was appointed and began serving as a District Court Judge,
and inadvertently signed the Findings submitted by the State of
Utah.

A Stipulation and Motion for Order Vacating Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law and Judgment Signed March
submitted

April

28,

1993

(R.404-405),

and

an

23, 1993 was

Order

Vacating

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment was entered
April 29, 1993.

(R.411-412).

The State then requested a hearing regarding the parties'
competing versions of proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law
and judgment (R.402-403).

This request was denied by Judge David

Roth on April 8, 1993, with a note that said, "I am adopting this
transcript

[of

the February

11 ruling

findings of fact and conclusions of law.

from

the

bench] as my

I don't have the time or

patience to try to choose which party's version is more accurate."
3

(R.373).
Judge Medley signed the final Order and Judgement on August
11, 1993-

(R.414-418).

The Notice of Appeal was filed by the

State on September 9, 1993.

(R.419-420).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 31(b), provides:
(b) The following are matters which the court
consider for expedited decision without opinion:

may

(1) appeals involving uncomplicated factual issues
based primarily on documents;
(2) summary judgements;
(3) dismissals for failure to state a claim;
(4) dismissals for lack of personal or subject
matter jurisdiction; and
(5) judgments or orders based on uncomplicated
issues of law.
(c)
In all motions brought under this rule, the
substantive rules of law should be deemed settled,
although the parties may differ as to their application.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22 (1992) provides that "an action to
enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to provide
support or maintenance for dependent children" must be brought
within eight years.
The Limitation of Acts chapter also provides:
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for
the recovery of real property, is at the time the cause
of action accrued, either under the age of majority or
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the
time of the disability is not a part of the time limited
for the commencement of the action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1992).

The Uniform Act on Paternity,

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-3 (1992), provides:
The father's liability for past education and necessary
support are limited to a period of four years next
preceding the commencement of an action.
4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In June 1984, Cathy Parker was attending school in Utah where
she met Harry Irizarry.

(R.439).

Ms. Parker and Mr. Irizarry

began dating and developed a sexual relationship.

(R.440).

As a

result of this sexual relationship, Ms. Parker became pregnant.
(R.439).

She found out she was pregnant sometime near the end of

July 1984 or the beginning of August 1984.

(R.440).

Ms. Parker returned to California at the insistence of her
mother, who found out about the sexual relationship between Ms.
Parker and Mr. Irizarry.

(R.440).

After Ms. Parker left Utah, but

before she informed Mr. Irizarry of her pregnancy, Mr. Irizarry
wrote her a letter, dated August 6, in which he wrote about his
upcoming trip to California.

(Plaintiff's Ex. 1 ) .

Mr. Irizarry visited Ms. Parker in California in August 1984,
when Ms. Parker told him she was pregnant.

(R.446-448; 558). Mr.

Irizarry indicated that he would do what he could to assist Ms.
Parker financially; however, he indicated he would not be able to
do much until he finished school in about two years.

(R.450, 561).

In September 1984, Mr. Irizarry testified that he sent money
(even though he wasn't sure he was the father) to Ms. Parker, which
she kept.

(R.565).

The amount of money sent in September was not

disclosed at the trial, but Mr. Irizarry stated he followed up with
a telephone call to Ms. Parker after sending this letter.

He

testified that Ms. Parker had been angry during this September
phone call and had told him not to send money again.
Mr. Irizarry did not contact Ms. Parker in October 1984.
5

(R. 566).
(R.567).

Mr. Irizarry sent Ms. Parker a letter in November 1984 and enclosed
with the letter approximately $20.00.
accepted the money. (R.569).

(R.567-568).

Ms. Parker

Mr. Irizarry did not send any money

to Ms. Parker after November 1984.

(R.594).

In the latter part of November 1984, Ms. Parker called Mr.
Irizarry to tell him that she was expecting twins.

(R.452).

Irizarry did not contact Ms. Parker in December 1984.
Both parties testified

Mr.

(R.452).

that Mr. Irizarry called Ms. Parker in

January and she informed Mr. Irizarry that she would give the twins
the last name of Parker at birth.

(R.454, 565-571).

When Mr.

Irizarry called Ms. Parker in January 1985, Ms. Parker testified
she was angry because she had not heard
December
(R.453).

and had not received

from Mr. Irizarry in

a present or a Christmas

card.

Ms. Parker testified she never told Mr. Irizarry that

she did not want his support.

(R.460).

Mr. Irizarry met his current wife, Patty Irizarry, in October
1984.

(R.593).

He and Mrs. Irizarry began seriously dating in

February or March 1985.

The twins, Breanna and Brittany Parker,

were born on April 18, 1985.

(R.439).

Ms. Parker called Mr.

Irizarry in June 1985 to tell him of the birth of the twins.

Ms.

Parker testified that when she made this call, a female roommate of
Mr. Irizarry's answered the telephone.

Ms. Parker told her of the

birth of the twins and requested that she have Mr. Irizarry return
her call.

(R.454-455; 573). Mr. Irizarry testified that he tried

to call Ms. Parker after the birth and had "no luck."

(R.574).

He

stated that, after Ms. Parker had left the message about the birth
6

of the children, he had "tried to call her once, to no avail.
guess the phone was busy and I didn't try after that."

I

(R.594).

Ms. Parker testified that, in July 1985, she contacted Mr.
Irizarry

at his

father's

home.

Ms. Parker

and

Mr.

Irizarry

discussed the twins and agreed to meet in October 1985 so that Mr.
Irizarry could meet the babies.

(R.455).

Mr. Irizarry testified

that he had no memory of this phone call.

(R.574).

Ms. Parker

testified that she came to Utah for the October 1985 meeting but
Mr. Irizarry did not meet her.

She then went to Mr. Irizarry's

father's house and showed him his granddaughters.

(R.456).

Mr.

Irizarry testified that, in February 1986, his father told him that
Ms. Parker and the twins had visited him in October 1985.

(R.574-

576) .
In February 1987, Ms. Parker hired a private investigator to
find Mr. Irizarry.

(R.458-459, R.473).

The private investigator

found Mr. Irizarry in Puerto Rico, but he could not find a specific
address.

(R.458-459).

Mr. Irizarry married his present wife, Patty, in October 1985.
(R.577).

She was at the time of the marriage pregnant with a child

who was conceived in July 1985 — less than three months after the
birth of the twins.

(R.578).

Mr. Irizarry testified that, even

after Ms. Parker informed him of her pregnancy with
decided to marry the woman he loved.

(R.577).

twins, he

Mr. Irizarry and

his wife have four children, whose dates of birth are March 31,
1986; April 1, 1989; September 20, 1990; and January 21, 1993.
(R.578-579).
7

In October 1985, Mr. Irizarry honeymooned in Puerto Rico.
He subsequently began to work in Puerto Rico and did not return to
Salt Lake until September 1987.

(R.579-580). Ms. Parker's mother,

Marva

dated

Parker,

wrote

Irizarry's brother.

a

letter

(R.543).

knowledge of Ms, Parker.

August

16,

1987, to Mr.

The letter was written without the

(R.459)

Ms. Parker did not see the

letter until a deposition was taken as a part of this lawsuit.
(R.459).

In November 1988, Cathy Parker became aware of the return

of Mr. Irizarry to Utah when her mother, Marva Parker, saw Mr.
Irizarry at his place of employment in Salt Lake City.

(R.585).

After becoming aware of Mr. Irizarry's return to Utah, on May
30, 1989, the State of Utah, Department of Social Services filed a
complaint

on

establish

his

behalf

of

paternity

Cathy
of

obligation from their birth.

Parker

the

against

twins

(R.2-8).

and

Mr.

to

Irizarry

fix

a

to

support

A Stipulation and Agreement

was reached on July 10, 1990 wherein Mr. Irizarry acknowledged he
was the father of the twins.

(R.105-106).

An order determining

him to be the father was entered August 17, 1990.

(R.103-104).l

A temporary order of support setting a child support obligation
beginning September 1, 1990 was entered October 22, 1990.

(R.248-

252) .
Respite this acknowledgement of the paternity of the twins,
Mr. Irizarry presented evidence at the February 9, 1993 trial that
he had had questions about the relationship which Ms. Parker had
had with an old boyfriend shortly before his relationship with her
began. (R.551-553). Mr. Irizarry's counsel at the trial asked Ms.
Parker questions about this previous relationship with another man,
presumably with the intent to establish her client's belief about
the seriousness of the relationship between Mr. Irizarry and Ms.
Parker. (R.480-481) .

8

On February 9, 1993, the court conducted a trial.

(R.423).

Judge David E. Roth made his ruling from the bench on February 11,
1993.

(R.625).

The final judgment, entered on August 11, 1993,

fails to award child support for the time period from April 18,
1985, when the twins were born, through May 30, 1989.

(R.414-418).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A biological father should not be permitted to use the
equitable doctrine of estoppel as a shield in paternity and child
support cases to avoid part or all of his obligation to support his
child.

Adequate

limitation and protection

for the biological

father's financial obligation is found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-3
(1992), which confines the father's financial liability to the four
years next preceding the filing of the paternity complaint.
The

trial

court's

findings

concerning

any

"representation" by Cathy Parker, even when the evidence is viewed
in

the

light

most

favorable

to

them,

are

sufficient evidence and are clearly erroneous.

not

supported

by

Assuming that the

trial court's findings are sufficiently supported by the evidence,
the facts of this case do not support the application of equitable
estoppel to bar recovery of child support for the four years prior
to the filing of the paternity complaint, because the requisite
elements of representation, reliance, and detriment are lacking.

9

ARGUMENT
POINT I,
BECAUSE OF THE UNIQUE NATURE OF PATERNITY AND CHILD
SUPPORT ESTABLISHMENT CASES, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND
LACHES ARE INAPPROPRIATE AS DEFENSES TO A BIOLOGICAL
FATHER'S SUPPORT OBLIGATION.
A.
The Court of Appeals' holding in the unpublished
Burrow v. Vrontikis decision should not have been
considered by the lower court to be precedent for its
decision.
The trial court affirmed

the September

1, 19 90 paternity

judgement involving Breanna and Brittany Parker, who were born
April 18, 1985.

The complaint for paternity and child support was

filed on May 30,

1989.

The Court granted child support arrearages

to benefit the children only from the date of the filing of the
complaint until the Court's ruling on temporary child support and
from the ruling on the temporary support until January 31, 1993.
The court refused to award support for the period of time from the
birth of the twins until the filing of the paternity complaint
approximately four years after the birth of the children.
It is the position of the State of Utah, Office of Recovery
Services, that the trial court erred in not establishing a child
support

obligation

and

judgement

for

arrearages

against

Mr.

Irizarry for the four-year period of time from May 30, 1985 through
May 30, 1989.
Although the trial court does not specifically so state in its
Judgement, in its bench ruling the court made certain

factual

findings, which are discussed in detail at Point II of this brief.
The trial court then proceeded to conclude that
10

the plaintiff made statements, took actions that led the
defendant to reasonably conclude that she wanted nothing
to do with him and didn't want his support. In reliance
upon that, the defendant got on with his life, got
married
and
started
a
family
and
under
those
circumstances should not be responsible for the payment
of support until May 30, 1989, when this complaint was
filed.
At that point he obviously knew that the
plaintiff expected him to support these children.
(R.629-630).
Although the court below cites to no legal authority for its
conclusions, it appears that the court relied upon the decision of
the Utah Court of Appeals in Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P. 2d 1047
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), as that was the case argued by both counsel
at the trial.

(R. 605-609, 610-614).

In Vrontikis, the Court had

remanded the case back to the trial court after holding, in an
unpublished

opinion

(hereinafter

Vrontikis

I ) , that

equitable

estoppel was available in a paternity action to bar recovery for
child support during the period before the paternity complaint was
filed.

The procedural history of the published Vrontikis case

(Vrontikis

II) is of particular importance to this appeal, if

indeed the court below based its decision upon Vrontikis II as
being of precedential authority.
In Vrontikis I, the mother of a seven-year-old child filed a
paternity action against the father seeking back child support.
The trial court declared the defendant to be the father and awarded
back child support for the four-year period prior to the filing of
the paternity action.

The father appealed the court's decision.

During the pendency of that appeal, the Utah Supreme Court issued
11

Borland v. Chandler, 733 P. 2d 144

(Utah 1987).

The Court of

Appeals then reversed the trial court's judgement on the basis of
Borland and remanded the case to the trial court for consideration
as to whether laches and/or estoppel barred the mother's claim for
pre-filing child support.

See Vrontikis, 733 P.2d at 1047.

On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing
and found that : (1) appellant unreasonably delayed in
filing her claim for support; (2) this delay was more
than mere silence because of appellant's representations
to Snape; (3) respondent reasonably relied upon these
representations, and so married and assumed additional
financial obligations; and therefore (4) appellant's
claim was barred by the doctrine of laches and/or
equitable estoppel.
Id. at 1047-1048.
On appeal
upheld.

in Vrontikis

II, the

lower

court's

ruling

was

The Court of Appeals stated:

The first time this matter was before this court, we
held, in an unpublished opinion issued October 15, 1987,
that an equitable defense was available in a paternity
action. On that basis, we remanded the case to the trial
court for it to determine if laches and/or estoppel would
permit recovery of back child support. That decision is
law of this case. See Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler,
768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). If the elements
of laches and/or estoppel are present, appellant's claim
is barred.
Id. at 1048.

The Court went on to declare that estoppel is an

equitable doctrine which precludes parties from asserting their
rights where their actions render it inequitable to allow them to
do so.

Upon reviewing the doctrine of estoppel against the facts

presented to the lower court, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's decision that estoppel precluded the awarding of prefiling child support against the father of the child.
Of particular interest in the Vrontikis II decision is the
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Court of Appeal's reliance upon its earlier, unpublished, holding
that "an equitable defense was available in a paternity action."
Id. at 1048.

Presumably that holding was based upon the Supreme

Court's decision in Borland, which overruled Zito v. Butler, 584
P.2d 868 (Utah 1978) (per curiam).

Vrontikis, 733 P.2d at 1047.

However, the Court of Appeal's reasoning in the first Vrontikis
case is not available for review or analysis by parties to similar
actions, such as the parties to this appeal.

For that reason, the

holding of Vrontikis I and the Court of Appeal's application of
that holding as "law of the case" in the Vrontikis II decision
should be disregarded and considered of no precedential value.
Rule 31(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
for a process of expedited decisions without opinion. However, the
cases which qualify for expedited decisions without opinion are
limited to the following:
(1) appeals involving uncomplicated factual issues based
primarily on documents;
(2) summary judgements;
(3) dismissals for failure to state a claim;
(4) dismissals for lack of personal or subject matter
jurisdiction; and
(5) judgments or orders based on uncomplicated issues of
law.
Subsections

(c) and

(d) of

Rule

31 make

clear

that

an

appellate court may only issue decisions in unpublished opinions in
cases in which the substantive rules of law are deemed settled and
in cases
issues of

that do not raise substantial

constitutional

issues,

significant public interest, issues of law of first

impression or complicated issues of fact or law.

As will become

apparent from the argument which follows, the Court of Appeals'
13

decision in Vrontikis II to apply a defense of equitable estoppel
to a paternity and/or child support case was not based upon a
"settled" substantive rule of law.

Clearly, the Court of Appeals

should not have so cavalierly held, by unpublished decision in
Vrontikis I, that a child's right to financial support from his or
her

biological

father

could

be compromised

inactions of the custodial parent.

by

the actions

or

Without a published decision,

it is impossible for the parties in this appeal to discuss or
analyze the Court's reasoning in Vrontikis I or to know how that
Court interpreted the Supreme Court's holdings in Zito and Borland.
The Utah Supreme Court in a number of decisions, in dicta, has
noted its displeasure with the use of unpublished opinions.
State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d

568, 570 n.l

(Utah 1991),

In

Justice

Zimmerman noted with some concern the Court of Appeals' use of Rule
31 to dispose of the case being considered by the Supreme Court.
Justice Zimmerman pointed out the limitations of Rule 31 by its
express terms and opined that, in the Court of Appeals' unpublished
Gardiner decision, it had established a new rule of Utah law, as
apparently acknowledged by the opinion itself.
of

precedent

in

Utah

for

the

rule

of

Given the paucity

law being

analyzed

in

Gardiner, Justice Zimmerman felt there was little justification for
the usage by the Court of Appeals of an unpublished decision.
In his concurring opinion in Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P. 2d 96
(Utah

1986),

Justice

Zimmerman

commented

on the trial

court's

reliance upon an unpublished opinion of the Supreme Court in making
its

ruling.

The

Justice

expressed
14

his

displeasure

with

the

"inadvisable

practice"

of

issuing

unpublished

decisions

and

advocated for ending the practice of using unpublished opinions.
[I]f a case deserves being disposed of by written
opinion, that opinion should be published. If a decision
truly adds nothing to the law, it should be disposed of
from the bench or by a short written order that may be
informative to the parties but to no one else.
. . .
[T]he unpublished opinion . . . became part of a secret
body of law, available only to those who assiduously
collect our slip opinions. . . .[0]ther opinions
comprising this body of law can be brought to the
attention of trial judges only by those aware of them.
This gives special advantage to those who do more than
keep up their subscription to our official reports.
. When one lawyer is privy to our unpublished
opinions and another is not, the first lawyer may
properly conclude that he can use those unpublished
opinions that support him and ignore those that do not,
all with a minimal risk of exposure. . . . It is time we
stopped the practice of using unpublished opinions.
Id. at 104.
Because the Court of Appeals' ruling in Vrontikis II was based
entirely

upon

the

Court's

earlier

holding

in

an

unpublished

decision, it is the State's position that the ruling in the second
Vrontikis case is of no precedential weight or effect.
access

to

the earlier

unpublished

decision,

the

Not having

State

cannot

effectively urge this Court to reconsider or overrule the reasoning
of that earlier decision for the very reasons cited by Justice
Zimmerman in the above referenced cases.
Because the holding in the unpublished Vrontikis case is not
binding on this Court, see Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-508, this Court
must determine the current state of the law in Utah with respect to
usage of equitable defenses in child support and paternity actions
and apply that law to the present case.
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B. The
not be
defeat
or her
Utah's

doctrines of equitable estoppel and laches should
applied in paternity and child support cases to
the child's right to past child support from his
biological father.
case

law

with

respect

to

child

support

and

the

application of the doctrines of laches and equitable estoppel is,
at best, in desperate need of clarification from the appellate
courts of the State. As noted by the Court of Appeals in Vrontikis
II, Zito v. Butler, 584 P.2d

868

(Utah 1978) (per curiam), had

briefly addressed whether the defenses of equitable doctrines of
laches or estoppel applied in a paternity and child support action
filed four and one-half years after the birth of the child in
question.

With respect to that issue, the Supreme Court stated:

"This being a statutory action neither [of the equitable doctrines
of estoppel or laches] has any application."

Zito, 584 P. 2d at

869.
This summary holding regarding the nonapplication of equitable
defenses to a paternity action was reversed by the Utah Supreme
Court in Borland v. Chandler, 733 P. 2d 144 (Utah 1987).

Borland

held that laches may bar prosecution of an action to establish
paternity.

However, it did not address the issue, presented here,

of whether the equitable doctrine of estoppel can ever be asserted
by a biological father to defeat his obligation to support his
child.
The

primary

issue

before

the

Court

in

Borland

was

the

appropriateness of allowing a jury in a paternity case to view the
child for his resemblance to the alleged father.

The action in

Borland was brought by the State of Utah, Department of Human
16

Services, and the child's mother in 1980, seven years after the
birth of the child-

The father asserted that the action should be

barred by laches and asserted that the State's failure to prosecute
the action in a timely fashion was prejudicial to him in that, due
to the lapse in time, he was prevented from gathering and producing
documents and witnesses essential to his defense.

The Supreme

Court cited the reliance by the State and the mother on the holding
in Zito and

then concluded

that

laches may apply to preclude

prosecution of a statutory paternity action but that the facts of
that case were insufficient to invoke it.

Borland, 733 P. 2d at

The principle relied upon by the plaintiffs here has its
roots in the common law distinction between law and
equity. At common law, an equitable defense could not be
raised to a legal action, and because a statutory action
was legal in nature, equitable defenses would not apply.
This seems to be the theory behind Zito, a per curiam
opinion.
However, Utah long ago abolished any formal
distinction between law and equity. See Utah R. Civ. P.
2. It is well established that equitable defenses may be
applied in actions at law and that principles of equity
apply
wherever
necessary
to
prevent
injustice.
(Citations omitted.) Therefore, it is clear that under
appropriate circumstances r laches may bar an action for
paternity. Even the majority opinion in Nielsen ex.rel.
Department of Social Services v. Hansen, 564 P.2d 1113,
1114 (Utah 1977), cited by Zito, recognizes in dictum
that laches might apply in a paternity action. Therefore
we conclude that to the extent that Zito stands for the
proposition that an equitable defense is not available,
it is an incorrect statement of the law and is overruled.
Id. at 146 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The

Supreme

Court

went

on

17

to

hold

that,

in

order

to

successfully assert a laches2 defense, a defendant must establish
both that (1) the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an
action and (2) the defendant was prejudiced by that delay.
147.

Jjd. at

The Court ruled that Mr. Borland had not established his

attempts

to seek witnesses

and

his

inability

to

locate

these

witnesses or his employment time cards in order to establish his
whereabouts at the time of the child's conception.

The Court found

that Mr. Borland had conceded his return to Utah during part of the
conception

period

and

that

the

testimony of witnesses would
defense.

introduction

of

not have materially

evidence

and

assisted

his

"Under the circumstances, no prejudice is apparent and

further prosecution is not barred by laches."

Id.

The Court in Borland noted in a footnote that the Court in
Zito had discussed the application of the statute of limitations to
a paternity

action and had

cited

the case of Nielsen ex.rel.

Department of Social Services v. Hansen, 564 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1977),
and its analysis of the application of a statute of limitations to
child support matters.

The Borland Court stated that a "better

reasoned and more recent statement of the law may be found in
Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1982 (Utah 1981)."
at 14 7 n.l.
by

the

Borland, 733 P.2d

The Court's footnote raises the question, unexplored

Court

in

Borland,

of

what

would

be

an

"appropriate

circumstance" in which an equitable defense, such as laches or
2

Borland and Zito analyzed the complete defense of laches, and
yet the Court of Appeals in Vrontikis utilized those decisions for
its holding with respect to the application of equitable estoppel
in a paternity action to bar recovery of child support only during
the pre-filing period. See note 3, infra.
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estoppel, would bar an action for paternity against a biological
father, when under Szarak the statute of limitations is tolled for
the filing of a paternity action during the period of the child's
minority.

Another

doctrine of
biological

question

is how, in

light

of

Szarak,

the

laches could be used at all as a defense by the
father to a paternity action when the child is the

intended beneficiary of a child support order and a child, during
the period of his minority, cannot act to delay bringing a legal
action.3

See also Lee v. Gaufin, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1993)

(statutes of limitations and repose unconstitutional as applied to
minor's malpractice claim).
It is the State's position that it is not an

"appropriate

circumstance," within the holding in Borland, to allow a biological
father to use equitable doctrines to shield him from his financial
obligation to support a child he fathered.

On the other hand,

equitable defenses in the child support area may be "appropriate"
when employed as a sword by the mother, the child or the public
authority

to

hold

a

legal

(albeit

3

not

biological)

father

Another peculiar feature of the application of laches and/or
estoppel in a child support context is that the employment of those
defenses in the domestic area has not been interpreted as an
absolute bar to a biological father's obligation to pay child
support, but as only a partial bar prior to the time that a
paternity and/or support action is filed.
Typically when the
elements of equitable estoppel have been demonstrated, the defense
is an absolute bar to the liability of the person successfully
asserting the defense. See generally Mendez v. State, 813 P. 2d
1234 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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responsible for financial support to that child.4
Utah statutes provide two separate statutes of limitations
with respect to child support actions.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22

(1992) provides that "an action to enforce any liability due or to
become due, for failure to provide support or maintenance

for

dependent

The

children" must

be brought within

eight years.

Limitation of Acts chapter also provides:
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for
the recovery of real property, is at the time the cause
of action accrued, either under the age of majority or
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the
time of the disability is not a part of the time limited
for the commencement of the action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1992).
The Uniform Act on Paternity provides:
The father's liability for past education and necessary
support are limited to a period of four years next
preceding the commencement of an action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-3 (1992).
In Nielsen, a 1977 decision, the State and a child's mother
brought an action to establish paternity and to impose a child
support obligation, seeking support for only four months prior to
the filing of the action.
complaint

based

upon

the

The trial court had dismissed
statute

of

limitations,

the

specifically

section 78-12-22. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court,
holding there was no time limitation as to when a suit may be
instituted to determine paternity, noting that Utah Code Ann. § 7 8-

A

See Weise v. Weise, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985); Mace v. Webb,
614 P.2d 746 (Utah 1980); see generally State v. V.G.P. 845 P.2d 94
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) .
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45a-3 limited the father's liability for past support to the period
of four years next preceding the commencement of the action.
The significance of the reasoning in Nielson is the Court's
focus upon the child's interest in paternity and child support
cases:
The child has an interest in the matter and courts should
be reluctant to invent limitations not set out in the
statute, especially where minor children may be adversely
affected thereby. Ordinarily a statute limiting the time
for bringing an action is considered to be in the public
interest in that it prevents groundless actions from
being won because of defendant's inability to present
evidence. In cases of establishing paternity, there are
other public policy considerations such as the need of a
minor child for support and the requirement that the man
who actually sired the child be required to furnish its
support.
564 P.2d at 1114.
The issue of the statute of limitations and child support
collection was raised again in Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P. 2d 1082
(Utah 1981).

In that decision, the Utah Supreme Court noted that

the question of limitation of actions applicable to paternity and
child

support

cases

had

been a

"troubled

one, complicated

by

multiple parties, overlapping statutes, and contradictory judicial
opinions."

Id. at 1083.

The Court analyzed the Uniform Act on

Paternity and observed that a petition seeking to have paternity
established may be filed by the mother, the child, or the public
authority

(the

Department

of

Human

Services)

and

that,

once

paternity is established, the liability for child support may be
enforced in the same or other proceedings again, by the mother, the
child, or the public authority.

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45a-l,

78-45a-2 (1992).
21

The question before the Court in Szarak was whether there was
a limitation of time within which an action for paternity may be
commenced, recognizing that section 78-45a-3 limited the recovery
of

back

child

support

to

the

four

commencement of the paternity action*

years

next

preceding

the

In answer to that question,

the Supreme Court concluded that section 78-12-36, the tolling
statute

regarding

causes

of

actions

of minors, precluded

the

application of any period of limitation against the child, the
child's mother, and the public authority.

Szarak, 636 P. 2d at

1085.
The Court adopted its earlier reasoning in Scott v. School
Board, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977), a personal injury case involving
a minor.

In Scott, the Court pointed out that, because parents or

natural guardians have no specific legal duty to commence actions
on behalf of their minor children or wards, without a statutory
tolling provision for minors, the minor would be left completely
without a remedy.

The Court in Szarak went on to hold that the

statute of limitations was also tolled during the child's minority
for a paternity and child support action undertaken by the child's
mother and/or the State Department of Social Services, based upon
the public policies protected by the tolling provisions of section
78-12-36.
paternity

u

[A]ny

action

statute
must

be

limiting
commenced

the
under

time
the

within
Uniform

which

a

Act

on

Paternity is tolled for all statutorily qualified plaintiffs during
the period of the child's minority."

Szarak, 636 P.2d at 1085.

The protection afforded the biological father was the ceiling
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on the amount of the recovery for past child support (limited to
the period of four years next preceding the commencement of the
action), set forth in section 78-45a-3.
important
limitations

public
for

policy
filing

reasons

for

a paternity

The Court observed the
tolling

action

the

during

statute
the

of

child's

minority:
The father's liability for the education and support
of the child can be enforced by parties other than the
child, but in such cases the child is still the real
party in interest.
An action of this nature has no
purpose other than to benefit the child, directly or
indirectly.
No useful purpose would be served by
construing § 78-12-36 so as to preclude paternity actions
in the name of the mother or the public authority or
others who qualify as plaintiffs under the Uniform Act,
when those same parties would not be barred from bringing
the same action as next friend or guardian of the child.
Viewed from the defendant's perspective, this long
extension of the period of his (the alleged father's)
vulnerability to this kind of action obviously runs
counter to the policies served by the statutes of
limitations, but the Legislature has resolved the
conflicting policies in favor of the interests of the
minor child and those who support him . . . and we are
obliged to follow their clear direction.
Id. at 1085 (emphasis added).
It is the State's position that these same clear public policy
directions which protect the interests of a child in financial
support from his biological parent militate against allowing a
legally established father to assert the defenses of laches or
estoppel to avoid his child support obligation.

The child, under

section 78-45a-2 of the Uniform Act on Paternity, has a cause of
action

in his or her own right against

support.

The

child

is

the

real

party

paternity and/or child support action.
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the father
in

interest

for

child

in

every

It makes no sense to allow

an equitable defense, such as laches or estoppel, to be asserted
against the mother of a child when that same defense could not be
asserted

against

the child

himself

should

the

same action

be

brought in the child's name by a next friend or legal guardian.
The

child

cannot

act,

as

the

Court

held

in

Borland,

to

"unreasonably delay bringing an action" because the child's action
to establish paternity and enforce child support cannot be barred
by resting on his cause of action until after the child attains the
age of majority.
As the Court has pointed out in Szarak, the father may be
vulnerable to a paternity and support action for a long period of
time.

However, the Legislature has determined to grant to the

child, and to those persons supporting the child (the mother and
the public authority who may be supporting the child) eighteen
years in which to bring an action for paternity and support.

This

public policy determination is predicated upon the child being the
real party in interest in a paternity and support action.

In light

of that clear policy directive from both the Utah Legislature and
the Utah Supreme Court, it is the position of the State that the
equitable defense of laches should not be entertained as a defense
to preclude either the State, the custodial parent, or the child
from recovering back child support in a paternity action.

The only

limitation that should be applied in such cases is that set forth
in section 78-45a-3, limiting recovery of support to the period of
four years next preceding the commencement of the paternity action.
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In a similar fashion and for the same public policy rationale,
the defense of equitable estoppel predicated upon the actions or
inactions of a child's mother, prior to the filing of a paternity
complaint, should not be allowed to defeat the child's right to
financial support from his father, except as provided by section
78-45a-3.3
The Court of Appeals in Vrontikis II utilized the Utah Supreme
Court's holdings in the laches cases cited above, specifically Zito
and Borland, as authority for allowing equitable estoppel as a
defense against the mother in a paternity and child support case.
The Court in Vrontikis cited to a number of non-child support cases
and

then

set

forth

the necessary

proof

required

to

establish

equitable estoppel.
Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which precludes parties
from asserting their rights where their actions render it
inequitable to allow them to assert those rights.
Estoppel requires proof of three elements:
(1) a
statement, admission, act or failure to act by one party
inconsistent with a later-asserted claim; (2) the other
party's reasonable action or inaction based upon the
first party's statement, admission, act or failure to
act, and (3) injury to the second party that would result
from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate
its statement, admission, act, or failure to act.
Vrontikis, 788 P.2d at 1048.

While the Court in Vrontikis did set

forth accurately the elements of equitable estoppel, it did not
analyze the appropriateness of allowing that defense in a child

3

Utah courts have long held that the right to receive child
support is an unalienable right, belonging to the child, and cannot
be bartered away or estopped by the child's parents or others.
Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981); Baggs v. Anderson,
528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974); Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) .
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support action, a unique action in which the State of Utah is a
party and in which the child is the real party in interest.
The cases cited by the Vrontikis court for the
proposition are not child support cases.
estoppel

in

a

child

support

foregoing

The defense of equitable

situation

has

been

reviewed

specifically by the Utah Supreme Court in a number of decisions.
The Court's analysis in those cases is helpful, although they are
not directly on point to the present case.

In Mace v. Webb, 614 P.

2d 647, 649 (Utah 1980), the Supreme Court stated in dictum that
"in appropriate cases, a support obligation may be imposed on the
basis of estoppel or implied contract."

However, the Court also

expressed a caveat that "the use of an estoppel theory to impose a
support obligation on a man who is not the biological father of the
child involved must be applied with caution."

Id. at 649.

It is

important to note that in Mace, the Court discussed estoppel in the
context

of

imposing

a

support

obligation

on a

non-biological

father, not in the context of allowing the defense to evade a
support obligation on the part of the biological father, as the
Court of Appeals allowed in Vrontikis and as the trial court has
allowed in the instant case.
The same issue was before the Court in Wiese v. Wiese, 699
P. 2d

700

(Utah

1985),

in

which

the

mother

argued

that

the

stepfather of her child was equitably estopped from avoiding a duty
of support to the child he had treated as his own during the
marriage.

The Supreme Court cited with approval the reasoning in

Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 478 A.2d 351 (1984), which held that
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the party asserting equitable estoppel must carry the burden to
show that the stepfather's actions have precluded the obtaining of
support from the biological father.

The Court agreed with the New

Jersey Court in requiring the party alleging equitable estoppel to
prove

that

the

stepfather's

conduct

prerequisites to equitable estoppel:
detriment.

established

the

three

representation, reliance and

Wiese, 699 P.2d at 702.

Of particular

note

in the Wiese decision

is the

Supreme

Court's recognition, as in Szarak, of the child's separate and
independent interest in a support action.
[N]o legal authority is cited for the proposition that
[stepfather's] representations to the 1976 divorce court
preclude the boy, who was not a party to that action,
from obtaining support from his biological father. Other
jurisdictions have held that if a child is not a party to
a previous action adjudging him the offspring of the
parties, the child is not bound by that finding.
Wiese, 699 P.2d at 703 (citations omitted).
The

Supreme

Court

in

Wiese

reversed

the

lower

court's

judgement and order of support entered against the stepfather,
without prejudice to the mother to again bring an action

for

support against the stepfather when her efforts to obtain support
from the biological father (presumably her first husband) had been
concluded.

Only then could it be determined whether equitable

estoppel would lie.

Wiese, 699 P.2d at 703.6

6

It is interesting to note that the child at issue had been
born in 197 3 and the case remanded for the mother to pursue support
from her first husband in 1985 (the presumed biological father of
the child.)
The Utah Supreme Court made no reference to the
possibility that biological father might defeat his support
obligation by invoking the defenses of laches and/or estoppel.
The only potential concerns recognized by the Court with respect to
27

In a later case, Masters v. Worsley, 777 P. 2d 499 (Utah Ct.
App.

1989), an ex-husband

challenged

the paternity

of three

children born to his wife during their marriage after evidence of
the wife's unfaithfulness was uncovered after the divorce.

The

wife asserted that her ex-husband was equitably estopped from
denying liability for support of the three children.

Again, the

doctrine of equitable estoppel was being utilized to affirm, rather
than to defeat, a child support obligation.

In the Masters

decision, the Court of Appeals stated that equitable estoppel may
only be invoked when the conduct and circumstances would otherwise
perpetrate a fraud or unfair advantage.

The Court found that

Masters, the ex-husband, had not known that he was not the minor
children's father.

"Equitable estoppel may be invoked only to aid

a party who, without fault of his or her own, was 'deluded into a
course of action by the wrong of neglect of another.'"

Masters,

777 P.2d at 503 (citing Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d
695, 697 (Utah 1976) ) .
The Court of Appeals found that the mother had failed to
establish she was without fault in misleading her ex-husband to
believe he was the father of the children born during their
marriage. Thus, the Court concluded Mr. Masters was not equitably
estopped from terminating his child support obligation under the
previous divorce decree. In the instant case, Mr. Irizarry knew of

the biological father were that, after the passage of twelve years,
the mother may be unable to locate the natural parent or for valid
legal reasons may be unable to obtain jurisdiction over him.
Wiese, 699 P.2d at 703.
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the birth of the twins and certainly cannot argue, and has not
argued, that he was ignorant of their existence or that he had been
deluded into thinking no children had issued from his relationship
with Cathy Parker.
The Court in Masters, 777 P. 2d at 502, noted with approval the
language of Wiese and Mace that "the use of an estoppel theory to
impose a support obligation on a man who is not the biological
father of the child involved must be applied with caution."
the

State's

position

that

the

corollary

to

the

It is

foregoing

proposition is equally, or more, fitting in a paternity case and
child support case.

Namely, the use of an equitable estoppel

theory in a paternity case to defeat the support obligation of the
biological father should not be allowed.
interest
child's

favoring
separate

financial
and

The clear public policy

support of one's children and

distinct

interest

in

financial

the

support,

regardless of the actions or inactions of his biological parents,
weigh in favor of rejecting the defense of estoppel in paternity
and child support actions.
found

in

the

applicable

The limitations of financial liability
limitations

statutes

afford

the non-

custodial parent ample protection.
Additional support for the ruling the State seeks here is
found in the general rule of law that the doctrine of estoppel is
not assertable

against

the State and

its agencies.

The only

exception to this general rule of law is where it is plain that the
interests of justice so require.

In cases in which such an issue

arises, the critical inquiry is whether it appears that the facts
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may be found with such certainty, and the injustice to be suffered
is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception,

Utah State

Univ. v. Sutro & Co,, 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982);

Eldredqe v.

Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Because the State of Utah has separate standing and interest
as a party in child support and paternity cases, it is certainly
inadvisable and violative of the general rule of law espoused above
for the doctrine of estoppel to be invoked in child support and
paternity actions to defeat a claim for child support.

The State

of Utah, Department of Human Services, has a clear public policy
interest in paternity and child support cases, which is separate
and apart from that of the custodial parent and the child.
The application of the underlying holding and the reasoning of
Vrontikis to all paternity cases has allowed the putative father in
every paternity case to merely assert that the mother indicated, or
"suggested," in some manner she did not want support.
equitable

principles

in this

way

negates

sound

To invoke

public

favoring the responsibility to support one's children.

policy

It ignores

the clear mandate of section 78-45-3, which states that every man
shall support his child.
The

burden

placed

upon

the

mother

Vrontikis is extreme and unwarranted.

by

the

reasoning

in

Not only must she inform the

putative father that she is expecting his child, but she must
document every attempt she had made to remind him of his statutory
duty to provide financially for the child.

The result is that a

woman who is facing the tremendous obligations of an unplanned
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pregnancy

is held

to a standard

of behavior

beyond

realistic

expectations as she deals with the father of the child, a man who
often has abandoned her upon learning of the conception of the
child.

It

seems

reasonable

that

she

would

react

in

anger,

frequently demanding that he have nothing to do with her or the
child.

Such actions should not negate the law which is clear,

i.e., that he must provide for the support of his child.
In addition

to the

separate

interest

of

the

child

in a

paternity and support action, courts have uniformly found that a
State

has

support.

a

substantial

public

interest

in

collecting

child

That public interest can be gleaned from an examination

of the legislative purpose in enacting Title IV-D of the Social
Security Act.

Congress, at the time, was concerned

that the

welfare problem in this country was largely precipitated through
the non-support of children by absent parents and that four out of
every five recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) were in that condition as a result of the deprivation of
parental support.
93-1356,

93d

See Senate (Finance Committee) Report Rep. No.

Cong.,

2d

Sess.,

reprinted

in

1974

U.S.

Code

Congressional and Administrative News 8133, 8145. The solution was
to have the custodial parent, as a precondition of eligibility for
welfare, assign all rights to child support payments to the state
and then grant incentives to the states to enforce collection of
those debts.

Id. at 8152-54.

The procedures for collecting child

support were also required to be made available to families that
were not receiving AFDC in order to keep them off the welfare
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rolls.

Id. at 8158.

The duty of the child support enforcement

agency is to protect the integrity of the state's welfare rolls by
either

collecting

on

the

assignments

of

outstanding

support

obligations or by enforcing child support obligations to prevent
custodial parents from going on public assistance.

This duty to

recoup, or preserve, the State's available welfare funds creates a
separate

and

distinct

interest

in

the

State

of

Utah

in

the

establishment of paternity and the collection of child support, an
interest that may conflict with the interests of the custodial
parent.
In Wehunt v. Ledbetter, 875 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1988), the
court analyzed the Title IV-D program and found that the IV-D
program seeks to recover funds provided to children in need and to
restore to the federal Treasury, through enforcement of support
obligations, those monies owed by absent parents of children.
The driving force behind the program is recovery of
welfare payments and a parallel commitment to remove and
keep families from the necessity of welfare dependence by
establishing and enforcing support obligations.
The
legislative history indicates that in enacting Title IV-D
Congress was primarily concerned with collecting child
support in order to reduce the welfare rolls.
Id. at 1565.
The Missouri Court of Appeals has found a substantial state
interest in collecting child support in both AFDC and non-AFDC
collection cases.

In Leet v. Leet, 624 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. 1981), Mrs.

Leet had a non-AFDC child support collection case open with the
State of Missouri.

The State filed contempt proceedings against

Mr. Leet for his failure to pay child support.
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Mr. Leet countered

by arguing that the State was violating its state constitution's
ban on granting public monies to agencies or organizations for
private purposes.

He claimed that since Mrs. Leet was not on

welfare, the state was enforcing her private interest and had no
public interest at stake. The trial court agreed with Mr. Leet and
ruled that the state's involvement in a non-AFDC collection case
violated the state's constitutional ban of public expenditures on
private interests.
finding

that

the

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court,
State

has

a

substantial

public

interest

in

enforcing child support collection cases, including non-AFDC cases:
[The requirement that states enforce non-AFDC as well as
AFDC collection cases] was a recognition by Congress that
in view of the increasing costs of welfare payments to
families of abandoned children it is in the public
interest not only to get and keep families off the
welfare rolls, but also to assist families in not
becoming members of those rolls.
Id. at 23. The Court in Leet concluded that the fact that there is
a benefit to the custodial parent from the State's child support
collection

services does not change the public purpose of the

collection:
The law does not require [the courts] to determine
whether the public or private citizens benefit 'more' by
reason of the legislation. Rather, the rule is that if
the primary purpose of the act is public, the fact that
special benefits may accrue to some private persons does
not deprive the government action of its public
character, such benefits being incidental to the primary
public purpose.
Id. at 23.
The Washington Supreme Court has similarly concluded

that

federal and state statutes created the child support enforcement
program to further the compelling public interest in "safeguarding
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the child's constitutional rights, protecting the taxpayers, and
assuring that the primary obligation for child support falls on the
parents."

Johnson v. Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d 255, 634 P.2d 877, 881

(1981) .
This separate and important interest held by the State of
Utah, especially in light of the general rule of nonapplication of
estoppel as a defense against the State, also militates against the
defenses of laches and estoppel being used to avoid the recovery of
child

support

from

a biological

father.

The

State

of

Utah,

Department of Human Services, maintains that, in the context of
paternity and child support actions, the defenses of equitable
estoppel and laches predicated upon the actions or inactions of the
custodial parent should not be employed to defeat the right of the
child to financial support from his or her biological father.

The

trial court in this case should not have used the doctrine of
estoppel to shield Mr. Irizarry from four years of his support
obligation to his natural children.
POINT II.
EVEN IF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL MAY BE
APPLIED IN A PATERNITY AND CHILD SUPPORT CASEf THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDINGS ON THE NECESSARY ELEMENT OF THE
REPRESENTATION MADE BY MS. PARKER ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
In order to mount a successful attack on the lower court's
factual findings in this appeal, the State of Utah must marshall
all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then
demonstrate that, even viewing evidence in light most favorable to
the findings, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings,
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or that the findings are otherwise clearly erroneous. A finding is
clearly erroneous when, even though there is evidence to support
it,

the

reviewing

court

is

left

with

the

conviction that a mistake has been committed.

definite

and

firm

The appellate court

does not consider evidence de novo, so the mere fact that the
reviewing court may reach a different result than the trial court,
on the same evidence, does not justify setting aside the trial
court's findings.

Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 88 (Utah

Ct. App. 1989).
The burden upon the State has been met in this case, because,
after marshalling all the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
those findings, the evidence is patently insufficient to support
the lower court's apparent finding that there was a statement,
admission, or act on the part of Ms. Parker that was inconsistent
with her later-asserted claim for child support for her children
for the four years prior to the filing of the paternity complaint
against Mr. Irizarry.
the

representation

The lower court's findings with respect to

element

of

equitable

estoppel

are

clearly

erroneous in that the court has interpreted Ms. Parker's actions or
omissions

prior to the birth of the children

to constitute a

representation that she did not want financial support from Mr.
Irizarry for those children.

The court pointed out in its ruling

from the bench that the
critical, factual issue in determining whether the
defendants should be responsible for support during 1985
to 1987 period is whether or not the plaintiff made
statements claimed by the defendant in those three phone
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calls.
Plaintiffs denies making statements to him
suggesting she doesn't want support from him for the
children.
In making this "critical, factual" finding with respect to the
representations made by Ms. Parker to Mr. Irizarry, the trial court
focused upon four other underlying factual findings or reasons.
The court's first finding (R.628) was as follows:
[DJuring the period of time in question, there is no
indication that the plaintiff [Ms. Parker] made calls or
wrote letters to the defendant [Mr. Irizarry] asking for
support. It appears that all the communications at that
time were from the defendant to the plaintiff.
The lower court relied on the following evidence to support
its findings:
1.
A September 1984 letter from Mr. Irizarry to Ms.
Parker (which was not offered into evidence).
Mr.
Irizarry testified that he sent an undisclosed amount of
money with this letter and followed it up with a phone
call.
(R.565-566).
Mr. Irizarry testified that Ms.
Parker was angry when he spoke to her in September and
"she was clearly angry at me for sending money and she
said not to send money again.
She would finish her
degree and do it on her own." (R.566).
2. A November 1984 letter to Ms. Parker in which Mr.
Irizarry testified he enclosed $20. (Plaintiff's Ex. 2 ) .
3. A January 1985 phone call from Mr. Irizarry to Ms.
Parker in which she informed him that she would be naming
the children "Parker" on their birth certificate.
(R.
454, 565-571).
In this conversation, Mr. Irizarry
testified that Ms. Parker said: "I don't want to have to
do anything with you anymore."
(R.572). Mr. Irizarry
also testified that at that time, he still believed that
he had a financial obligation to the twins, if they were
his children. (R.572).
Although there is some evidence supporting the lower court's
findings regarding efforts on the part of Mr. Irizarry to contact
Ms. Parker, the evidence is also clear that all of these contacts
occurred prior to the birth of the children and, thus, prior to any
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legally

enforceable

financial

obligation

existing

against

the

biological father.

The children were born in April 1985 and Mr.

Irizarry testified

himself

that he only made one half-hearted

attempt to reach Ms. Parker after the birth, i.e, the phone call to
her when the phone was busy.

(R.594).

From the testimony at the

trial, an inference could certainly be drawn that Mr. Irizarry
still had doubts about the paternity of the twins, considering his
beliefs regarding Ms. Parker's having had a previous relationship
with another man.

(R. 480-481).7

However, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the findings, it is clear that Mr. Irizarry made no serious
effort to contact Ms. Parker after the birth of the twins or to
communicate his position with respect to their financial support,
assuming they were proved to be his biological children.
Parker's

only

affirmative

representations

with

respect

Ms.

to her

future plans to seek support from Mr. Irizarry were an angry phone
call in November 1984 and another angry phone call in January 1985,
both prior to the birth of the twins.
In addition, the trial court's "finding" with respect to the
inaction of Ms. Parker in contacting Mr. Irizarry

ignores her

efforts to inform Mr. Irizarry about the children after their
birth.
1.

Her efforts can be summarized as follows:
In June 1985, Ms. Parker called to tell Mr. Irizarry

7

"I was very anxious and upset [at Ms. Parker's reaction to
the November letter] because I was trying to do the right thing
even though I wasn't sure that I was the father. I was trying to
do the right thing and she was angry at that. So I was upset too."
(R.570).
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that the children were born and left the message with a
female roommate. She left a message asking Mr. Irizarry
to call her. (R.454, 573).
2. In July 1985, Ms. Parker testified that contacted Mr.
Irizarry at his father's home and they discussed the
twins and set up a meeting time for October 19 85 to see
the twins. (R.455). Mr. Irizarry denied any memory of
this phone call. (R.574-576.)
3.
In October 19 85, Ms. Parker arrived to meet Mr.
Irizarry. The meeting never occurred but Ms. Parker did
take the children to the home of Andre Irizarry, (their
grandfather) to meet him.
(R. 456).
Mr. Irizarry
testified that he became aware of this meeting in
February 1986 while living in Puerto Rico. (R.456).
4. In October 1985, Ms. Parker went to Mr. Irizarry's
father's home [looking for Mr. Irizarry]. (R.456).
5.
In February 1987, Ms. Parker hired a private
investigator to find Mr. Irizarry. (R.458-459, 473).
These affirmative actions taken by Ms. Parker to contact Mr.
Irizarry,

after

the

birth

of

the

children

(when

his

support

obligation became enforceable), are more consistent with a finding
that she did want Mr. Irizarry's support for her children than the
contrary.

Her efforts occurred after the birth of the children.

Mr. Irizarry's minimal efforts and offers of support occurred prior
to the birth when he still may have been questioning the paternity
of the children.8
favorable

to

the

Even viewing the evidence in the light most
trial

court's

finding

with

respect

to

communications between the parties, the evidence is insufficient to
support the finding and is clearly erroneous.
8

Ms. Parker testified that she had never told Mr. Irizarry
that she did not want him to pay support for the twins.
(R.460)
The lower court in its ruling did not indicate that Ms. Parker
lacked credibility on this issue of financial support nor did it
indicate that other testimony clearly contradicted Ms. Parker's
statements under oath.
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The trial court's next subsidiary finding is as follows:
[T]he plaintiff left the defendant's name off the birth
certificates. This suggests to me or at least reinforces
the defendant's belief that she wanted nothing to do with
him,
I have no trouble with her naming the children
"Parker." There is no law, I am aware of, requiring that
the children bear the father's name. The best interest
of the children are what prevailed there, and under these
circumstances, in my mind, there is nothing wrong with
the children being named "Parker." But leaving the
father's name off the birth certificates suggest to me
some animosity toward the defendant and suggest to me
that where the defendant said she said she wanted nothing
to do with him, that may have been correct.
(R.628).
January

From Ms. Parker's emotional response to Mr. Irizarry's
1985 phone call, the trial court inferred

representation suggesting she wanted

she made a

"nothing to do with him,"

presumably including that she did not want financial support for
her as-yet-unborn children.

(R.453).

The trial court acknowledged

that the choice of the children's last name was probably in the
best interest of the children, yet inferred that such a decision
shows antagonism towards the father.

If it is proper for a court

to deem antagonism between parents as a proper factor to consider
in determining whether child support is owing, then there would be
very few children receiving support.
Even
decision

viewing
to

give

the
her

evidence
twins

her

with

respect

last

name

in

to

Ms.

the

Parker's

light

most

favorable to the court's findings, that evidence is insufficient to
support

the

court's

apparent

finding

that

Ms.

Parker

had

represented she wanted no financial support for her children after
their birth.
The court's third subsidiary finding is as follows:
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[D]uring the time from August of '84 to the birth of the
children, or until October of '85, plaintiff had family
support. She had insurance to cover, I assume, most of
the birth cost. She was about to start a career as a
nurse and she was capable of supporting herself and her
children.
There is pretty good evidence of animosity
from her family toward the defendant which suggested
likely she didn't want much to do with him at the time.
I find this first because the family moved her from Salt
Lake City to California to discourage her relationship
with the defendant.
And at the time the defendant
visited in California, her mother especially was very
angry with the defendant.
JR.628-29).
The foregoing finding by the trial court, although supportable
in the evidence, utilizes the feelings of Ms, Parker's family and
her ability to support herself as a basis for finding that she
"represented" to the biological father that she did not want his
financial support for her children.

No case law supports the trial

court's attribution of the feelings of Ms. Parker's family to her
desire for support.

Ms. Parker's mother's feelings towards Mr.

Irizarry are irrelevant to a finding of estoppel because those
feelings do not involve any conduct, inaction or representation by
Ms. Parker.

See generally Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P. 2d 430, 432

(Utah 1983).

Furthermore, there is no case law to support the

trial court's suggestion that Ms. Parker's efforts to educate and
obtain

employment

to

support

herself

and

her

children

would

necessitate a finding that she did not want or need support from
the biological father of those children.

Such a finding, if upheld

as proper, would have a chilling effect on mothers who are making
an effort to provide financially for their children.

The trial

court's findings in this regard are clearly beside the point and
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insupportable and, to the extent that they have been utilized to
bolster the court's ultimate finding that Ms. Parker represented to
Mr. Irizarry that she wanted no child support, should be completely
disregarded by this Court.
The trial court's fourth subsidiary finding is as follows:
[T]he letter dated November 18, 1984 from the defendant
to the plaintiff suggests the defendant's willingness to
accept responsibility for the child and pay for support.
But to me his statement in that letter thanking the
plaintiff for accepting the money suggests that there had
been
some
discussions
about
this
in
earlier
conversations: that the plaintiff didn't want money from
the defendant.
I find it unusual that he would say
"Thank you for accepting this money."
(R.629).
The foregoing factual finding is supported only by the actual
content of the November 18, 1984 letter.

That letter (Plaintiff's

Ex. 2) states, in pertinent part:
Here I include some $. I know is [sic] nothing, but a
little never hurts. As I already told you I am gong to
keep sending some every month, depending on the budget.
Thanks for accepting it, because I think is [sic] my
responsibility to help in the best way I can. I hope to
hear from you soon.
In the meantime take care of
yourself and of the baby too. Love Harry.
The trial court inferred from Mr. Irizarry's "thank you for
iccepting" language that he had been forced to ask Ms. Parker to
:ake any kind of support and that she had represented she did not
*ant financial support after the birth of the twins.

However, the

:estimony also indicated that the support offered in this letter
ms only $20 and was money offered to Ms. Parker prior to the birth
)f the twins.

(R. 567-568).

A more plausible inference from the

.etter would be that Ms. Parker was insulted by the tender of a
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mere $20 when she was undergoing a pregnancy and the substantial
expenses of necessary prenatal care.
The letter could also be interpreted as an acknowledgement on
the part of Mr. Irizarry of his responsibility to provide support
for the baby expected by Ms. Parker.

In its findings, the court

failed to address the testimony of Ms. Parker that she never said
she did not want support (R.460), that she accepted the support
money which was sent (R.549), and that Mr. Irizarry represented to
her that he would do what he could financially to assist her.
(R.450, 561).

In addition, at most Mr. Irizarry could establish

Ms. Parker's silence from the time she attempted to contact him in
July and October 1985 until February 1987 when she hired a private
detective to try to locate him, without success.

The evidence

indicates that Ms. Parker did not know the whereabouts of Mr.
Irizarry for the majority of the four years between the birth of
the girls until the filing of the paternity complaint.

At best,

any delay was mere silence on the part of Ms. Parker.

The Utah

Supreme Court has ruled that mere silence is not sufficient for a
finding of estoppel, unless there is some duty to speak, Adams v.
Adams, 593 P. 2d 147 (Utah 1979), and there was no such duty in this
case.
Even viewing all of the evidence offered at trial in the light
most favorable to the trial court's finding on the element of the
representations or actions of Ms. Parker that could have led Mr.
Irizarry to believe that she did not want support for her children,
the evidence is simply insufficient to support the factual finding
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that Ms. Parker made such a representation.

Without evidence to

support that finding, the trial court clearly erred in finding that
Ms. Parker is estopped to assert claims for child support for the
four years prior to the filing of the paternity complaint against
y[r. Irizarry.

Additionally, the lower court made no clear finding

Dn the other two requisite elements of equitable estoppel--i.e.,
regarding Mr. Irizarry's reliance upon Ms. Parker's statements and
lis consequent detriment.

Without a clear finding on all elements

Df estoppel, the trial court clearly erred in concluding

that

estoppel barred recovery of support during the pre-filing period.
POINT III.
EVEN IF THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING ON THE REPRESENTATION
ELEMENT OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS,
THE FACTS FOUND DO NOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL AS A DEFENSE TO MR. IRIZARRY'S PRE-FILING
SUPPORT OBLIGATION TO HIS BIOLOGICAL CHILDREN.
If equitable estoppel is available to bar recovery of child
lupport from a biological father that accrued prior to filing of
.he paternity action, this Court must next determine whether the
vidence presented to the trial court in this case was sufficient
o support a finding of estoppel.
As discussed

in detail above, a parry alleging

equitable

stoppel as a defense must establish three clear prerequisites:
epresentation, reliance and detriment.
he

burden

of

establishing

these

Mr. Irizarry has not met

elements

of

estoppel.

The

tatements, actions, or inactions of Ms. Parker, which the lower
ourt found to be inconsistent with her later assertion of a claim
Dr child support for her two children, predated the birth of those
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children.

As already set forth at Point II of this Brief, the

trial court's findings regarding the actions or inactions of Ms.
Parker as evidence of a representation "suggesting" that support
would not be sought are not supported and are clearly erroneous.
The second element of estoppel
failed

to

make

a

clear

finding)

(on which
is

that

the lower court

Mr.

Irizarry

took

reasonable action based upon the statements or actions of Ms.
Parker.

This element is not supported by the evidence presented to

the trial court.

Mr. Irizarry's only contacts with Ms. Parker

predated the birth of the children for whom she and the State of
Utah now seek support.

Although Ms. Parker left messages for Mr.

Irizarry and tried to arrange for him to meet the children, Mr.
Irizarry made no effort (beyond placing a phone call to Ms. Parker
when her phone was busy) to contact her, to meet his children, or
to establish whether the twins were his biological offspring.
The element of reliance is most difficult for Mr. Irizarry to
establish in this case and the evidence indicates that his burden
has

not

been

conversations

met.

Mr.

Irizarry

testified

with Ms. Parker before

that,

the twins were

after

his

born, he

incurred further financial obligations by marrying his current wife
and having additional children.

But there is no evidence that his

decision to enter into a marriage and father other children was
made in reliance on any statement or inaction of Ms. Parker and, if
there was any such reliance, it could not have been reasonable.
Considering that Mr. Irizarry was dating his current wife during
the pregnancy

of Ms. Parker and that his current wife
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became

pregnant before their marriage and less than three months after the
birth of Brittany and Breanna, Mr. Irizarry's argument concerning
his reliance is, at best, disingenuous. Additionally, Mr. Irizarry
continued to incur financial obligations by fathering
after the complaint was filed

(R.578-579) and a child after an

order of support for the twins was entered.
252).

children

(R.578-579, R.248-

In other words, there is no sufficient showing that Mr.

Irizarry acted in reliance on any representation concerning his
lack of financial responsibility for the twins.

On the contrary,

Mr. Irizarry testified that after Ms. Parker informed him of the
pregnancy with the twins, he decided to just "carry on and marry
the woman he loved," Patty Irizarry.

(R.578).

The facts of this case demonstrate no representations, either
explicit or implicit, by Ms. Parker to Mr. Irizarry with respect to
her claim for child support for her children for the four years
prior to the filing of this paternity action.

The record below

does not show that Ms. Parker unfairly misled Mr. Irizarry in any
way, nor that he changed his position to his detriment in reliance
on any representations, actions, or inactions by Ms. Parker.
In short, none of the elements of equitable estoppel are
present in this case.

The trial court's ruling to the contrary

should be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to amend
the judgement against Mr. Irizarry by ordering him to pay child
support for Breanna and Brittany Parker for the period from May 30,
1985 to May 30 1989.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the lower
court's ruling and judgment to the extent they award no pre-filing
child support for Mr. Irizarry's twin daughters.

In addition, the

case should be remanded to the trial court for entry of an amended
judgement against Mr. Irizarry for an appropriate amount of child
support for the time period from May 30, 1985 through May 30, 1989.
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ADDENDUM
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78-12-22

JUDICIAL CODE

lapse of time, heirs are also barred, had no application where property had been distributed
in accordance with statute, and heir seeking to
recover such property distributed to him while
he was minor within two years after he
attained majority was not barred from maintaining action, since limitation did not start to
run against plaintiff until he had attained majority under this section Robbms v Duggms,
61 Utah 542, 216 P. 232 (1923) (decided under
prior law).

—Right to title.
Where defendant purchased tax deed from
county, and immediately thereafter entered
into possession of property, paid taxes on prop.
erty for statutory time, made valuable im.
provements on property, and held property
openly and notoriously, he was entitled to have
title to property in controversy against all parties except those under disability. Baker ^r.
Goodman, 57 Utah 349, 194 P 117 (1920)."

Purchaser at tax sale.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 178 et seq
C.J.S. — 54 C J S. Limitation of Actions
§ 105 et seq

Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions
70 et seq

ARTICLE 2
OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY
78-12-22. Within eight years.
Within eight years:
An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States or of
any state or territory within the United States.
An action to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to provide
support or maintenance for dependent children.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-22; L. 1975, ch. 96, § 26.
Cross-References. — Execution to issue
within eight years, Rule 69(a), U R.C.P
Judgment a hen for eight years, § 78-22-1

Uniform Act on Paternity, § 78-45a-l et seq.
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,
§ 78-45-1 et seq
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act $ 77-31-1 et seq

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Judgments or decrees
Paternity proceedings
Pleadings.
Renewal of judgment
Stipulations
Support or maintenance.
Tolling.
Cited.
Judgments or decrees.
Statute of limitations begins to run from
time of the rendition and entry of judgment or
decree Sweetser v Fox, 43 Utah 40, 134 P
599, 47 L.R.A. (n.s ) 145, 1916C Ann. Cas. 620
(1913)
Where judgment payable in installments
provided that plaintiff could have execution for

total amount due if default in payments should
be made, plain intent was that execution
should issue for only such amounts as were due
at time of default so that statute did not begin
to run from date of default Buell v DucheBO*
Mercantile Co , 64 Utah 391, 231 P. 123 (1924)In case of a judgment payable in instair
ments, statute runs from time fixed for p«T
ment of each installment for the part then p<J|
able, and not from date of the judgment. Bow
v Duchesne Mercantile Co , 64 Utah 391> f»*
P 123 (1924)
In actions for fraud, statute does not begin »
run until fraud is discovered or could h**
been reasonably discovered, but even W^J*?!
tion is not based on fraud, in equity *J**
cause of action is concealed from one in WW*
it resides by the one against whom it hes»
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his residence, and that proceedings under the
Nonresident Motorist Act are the only Utah
proceedings in which the applicable statute of

78-12-36

limitations is not tolled by absence from the
state. Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 111
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937, 945.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 154 et seq.
C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 100.

A.L.R. — Tolling of statute of limitations
during absence from state as affected by fact
that party claiming benefit of limitations remained subject to service during absence or
nonresidence, 55 A.L.R.3d 1158.
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «=
84, 85.

78-12-36. Effect of disability.
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real
property, is at the time the cause of action accrued, either under the age of
majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the time of
the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the
action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-36; L. 1975, ch. 67, § 16; 1987,
ch. 19, § 5.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1987, ch. 19, § 6
provides that the amendment to this section,
deleting a reference to imprisonment as a disability, applies only to causes of action that
arise after April 27, 1987 and has no retroactive application.
Cross-References. — Actions to recover
real property, effect of disability, § 78-12-21.

Age of majority, § 15-2-1.
Disaffirmance of contract by minor,
§§ 15-2-2, 15-2-3.
Guardians
of incapacitated
persons,
§ 75-5-301 et seq.
Medical malpractice actions, limitations provisions applicable regardless of disability,
§ 78-14-4.
Product Liability Act, limitations provisions
applicable regardless of disability, § 78-15-3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Mental illness.
Notice of claim requirements.
—Failure to file.
Action barred.
Action not barred.
Paternity action.
—Minority.
Wrongful death.
—Minonty.
Cited.
Mental illness.
Plaintiffs incest-related psychological probers w e r e n o t a m e n t a i illness that would toll
«f statute of limitations. Whatcott v.
w
hatcott, 790 P.2d 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Notice of claim requirements.
-Failure to file.
^ l T A c t i o n barred.
This section had no application to action

against town which was barred because of failure to file claim. Hurley v. Town of Bingham,
63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213 (1924).
This section does not operate to extend statutory time for filing claims against a city until
after a minor claimant has obtained majority.
Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492
P.2d 1335 (1972).
Specific requirement of timely notice to city
of claim against it takes precedence over provision tolling statute of limitations during minority of a child; failure to comply with statutory notice provisions barred action against
city hospital by parents on behalf of newborn
infant. Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d
799 (Utah 1975).
Action not barred.
Notice of claim requirements in the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-13, are
tolled by this section during the period of minority; therefore, failure to comply with such
notice requirements by a minor does not bar
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UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY

78-45a-l

78-45-13. Interpretation and construction.
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 14.
Meamng of "this act" — See note under
same catchline following § 78-45-1

Cross-References. — Construction of statutes, Chapter 3 of Title 68

CHAPTER 45a
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY
Section
78-45a-l
78-45a-2
78-45a-3
78-45a-4
78-45a-5
78-45a-6
78-45a-6 5
78-45a-7
78-45a-8

78-45a-l.

Obligations of the father
Enforcement
Limitation on recovery from the
father
Limitations on recovery from
fathers estate
Remedies
Time of trial
Paternity action — Jury trial
Authority for blood tests
Selection of experts

Section
78-45a-9
78-45a-10
78-45a-ll
78-45a-12
78-45a-13
78-45a-14
78-45a-15
78-45a-16
78-45a-17

Compensation of expert wi
nesses
Effect of test results
Judgment
Security
Settlement agreements
Venue
Uniformity of interpretation
Short title
Operation of act

Obligations of the father.

The lather of a child that is or may be born outside of marriage is liable to
the same extent as the father of a child born withm marriage, whether or not
the child is born alive, for the reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy
and confinement and for the education, necessary support, and any funeral
expenses for the child For purposes of child support collection, a child born
outside of marriage includes a child born to a married woman by a man other
than her husband if that paternity has been established
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 1; 1990, ch.
245, § 22.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23 1990 substituted
outside of marriage for out of wedlock" in
both sentences and within marriage for in
wedlock" in the first sentence added "For pur
poses of child support collection and the clause

beginning 'if at the end in the second sentence and made stylistic changes
Cross-References. — Public support of chil
dren, §*? 62A-11-301 to 62A-11-332
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,
§ 78 45 1 et seq
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act, § 77-31-1 et seq

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action for reimbursement
—Collateral estoppel
—Costs
Action to establish paternity
—Attorney fees
—Statute of limitations
Tolling

Cause of action for support
Custody rights
—Acknowledgment of paternity
Right to trial by jury
Action for reimbursement.
—Collateral estoppel.
Where in a paternity action brought for reimbursement of money provided for the benefit
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UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY

78-45a-2.

78-45a-2

Enforcement.

Paternity may be determined upon the petition of the mother, child, putative father, or the public authority chargeable by law with the support of the
child. If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to
the laws of this state, the liabilities of the father may be enforced in the same
or other proceedings:
(1) by the mother, child, or the public authority that has furnished or
may furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses; and
(2) by other persons including private agencies to the extent that they
have furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 2; 1990, ch.
245, § 23.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted "putative father" in the first sentence and made
minor stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Enforcement of provi-

sions by Department of Human Services,
* 62A-M11.
Office of Recovery Services to perform duties
of Department of H u m a n Services in collecting
child support, § 62A-11-104.
Public support of children, §§ 62A-11-301 to
62A-11-332

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Right to counsel.

ANALYSIS

Estoppel and laches.
Evidence.
—Conception and birth.
Right to counsej.
— Indigent prisoners.
Blood tests.
Discretion of court.
Standard of proof.
—Preponderance of evidence.

—Indigent prisoners.

Estoppel and laches.
Under appropriate circumstances, laches
may bar an action for paternitv. Borland v
Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987)
A paternity action brought six years after
the birth of the child was not barred by laches,
where defendant made no factual showing to
support his argument that he was prejudiced
by the delay. Borland v. Chandler, 733 P 2d
144 (Utah 1987).
Evidence.
—Conception and birth.
Where child was conceived while mother was
married to her first husband and born while
she was married to her second husband, the
child was legitimate whichever husband was
the father, and testimony by mother that disputed second husband's fatherhood and supported first husband's fatherhood would not
illegitimize the child and was properly admissible in paternity action against first husband
Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982)

Blood tests.
While due process does not require Utah to
appoint counsel for all indigent prisoners who
are defendants in paternity cases, there may be
some complicated paternity suits in which the
risks of error would be high enough that the
presumption against the right to appointed
counsel would be overcome; given the availability and quality of the blood tests, there is
no need for appointment of counsel prior to the
time the tests are given Nordgren v. Mitchell,
716 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1983).
Discretion of court.
Due process of law does not require that all
indigent, incarcerated defendants in paternity
actions must always be appointed counsel,
whether due process requires the appointment
of counsel in such cases is vested in the discretion of the trial court. Nordgren v. Mitchell,
524 F. Supp. 242 (D. Utah 1981), affd, 716 F.2d
1335 (10th Cir. 1983).
Standard of proof.
— P r e p o n d e r a n c e of evidence.
The applicable standard of proof where paternity is asserted is "by a preponderance of
the evidence." Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640
(Utah 1982).
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78-45a-3

JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — Note, Establishing
Paternity Through HLA Testing: Utah Standards for Admissibility, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 717.
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note,
Wiese v Wiese: Support Obligations of Stepparents—The Utah Supreme Court Toppled by
Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 305 (1987).
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
§ 74 et seq.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 32 et seq.

A.L.R. — Death of putative father as precluding action for determination of paternity
or for child support, 58 A.L.R.3d 188.
Statute of limitations in illegitimacy or bastardy proceedings, 59 A.L.R.3d 685.
Necessity or propriety of appointment of independent guardian for child who is subject of
paternity proceedings, 70 A.L.R.4th 1033.
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=»
30 et seq.

78-45a-3. Limitation on recovery from the father.
The father's liability for past education and necessary support are limited to
a period of four years next preceding the commencement of an action.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 3.
Cross-References. — Limitation of action

for support or maintenance of dependent children, § 78-12-22.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Statute of limitations.
—Tolling.
While any statute limiting the time within
which a paternity action must be commenced
under the Uniform Act on Paternity is tolled

for all statutorily qualified plaintiffs during
the child's minority, the amount of recovery of
child support is still limited by this section.
Szarak v Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah
1981).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note,
Clark v. Jeter. Equal Protection Versus Statutes of Limitation in Paternity Actions, 15 J.
Contemp. L. 119 (1989).

Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
§ 127.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53.
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children *=>
35.

78-45a-4. Limitations on recovery from father's estate.
The obligation of the estate of the father for liabilities under this act are
limited to amounts accrued prior to his death and such sums as may be payable for dependency under other laws.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 4.
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this
act," as used in this section, means Laws 1965,
ch. 158, which enacted §§ 78-45a-l to
78-45a-17.

Cross-References. — Civil liability for support, Chapter 45 of this title.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
127
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53.

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children
35.
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JAN GRAHAM #1231
Attorney General
BY: BENJAMIN T. WILSON #5823
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor
P. O. Box 1980
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1980
Telephone: (801) 538-4660
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, Department of
Human Services, ex r l .
CATHY A. PARKER,

|

a\S5340

;i

^JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 890903363PA

HARRY D. IRIZARRY,

Judge TYRONE MEDLEY

Defendant.
This matter came on for trial on February 9, 1993, before
the Honorable David E. Roth, Senior Judge Pro Tem.

Plaintiff,

State of Utah was represented by Benjami; T. Wilson, Assistant
Attorney General.

Cathy Parker was present.

Defendant, Harry D.

Irizarry, was present and repreF^ttrfi by Elisabeth R. Blattner of
and for Parsons Behle * Latimer.

After hearir*^ the testimony of

the witnesses, receiving the exhibits and stipulations of the
parties and the representations and arguments of counsel, the
Court took the matter ; .ar advisement.

n February 11, 1993 at

9:30 a.m., being fully advised, the Court issued its oral ruling

F

in this inattar in open court.

The Court now has entered its

written findings c2 fact, and conclusions cf law and
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
i.

The judgment of paternity entered in this matter on

September 1, 1990, is hereby affirmed, and Harry D. Irizarry is
the father of Breannr* and Brittany Parker born April 18, 1985.
2.

JTJEGJGENT is entered in favor of Plaintiff, Cathy

Parker, and against Defendant, Karry irizarry, in the amount of
$3,109.00 for back child support for the period from May 31, 1989
to September 1, 1930.
3.

JUDGMEHT is entered in favor of Plaintiff, Cathy

Parker, and against Defendant, Harry Iri2arry, in the amount of
$960*24 for prejudgment interest on the child support owed for
the period from May 31, 1989 to September I, 1990.
4.

JUDGMEHT is entered in favor of Plaintiff, Cathy

Parker, and against Defendant, Harry irizarry, in the amount of
$1,077.71 for child support arrearages under the temporary
support order in place from Septeniber 1, 1990 through January 31,
1993.
5.

JUDGMENT is entered in favor of Plaintiff, Cathy

Parker, and against Defendant, Harry Irizarry, in the amount of
$300.03

for interest accrued pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-

10.6(1)(a) on those child support arrearages under the temporary
2

support order.
6.

JUDGMENT is entered in favor of Plaintiff, Cathy

Parker, and against Defendant, Karry Irizarry, in the amount of
$541.85 for reimbursement of child care expenses paid by
plaintiff from May 31, 1989 through the time of trial.
7.

JUDGMENT is entered in favor of Plaintiff, Cathy

Parker, and against Defendant, Harry Irizarry, in the amount of
$187.35 for prejudgment interest on that child care.
8.

Commencing March 1, 1993, defendant is ordered to

pay to the plaintiff State of Utah, office of Recovery Services,
as ongoing child support, the sum of $289.15 per month consistent
with the attached Child Support Obligation Worksheet and
Worksheet to Determine Father's Obligations to Children in His
Present Home which are incorporated herein for reference.
9.

The mother is responsible for uninsured routine

medical and dental expenses, including routine office visits,
physical examinations, and immunizations.
10.

If medical, hospital and dental insurance are

available or become available through an employer or union at
group rates, or are otherwise available at reasonable cost, vo
either the mother or the father, or both of them, then the mother
or the father, or both of them, as the case may be, shall
maintain such insurance coverage.
3

11.

The mother and the father shall share equally all

other reasonable and necessary uninsured medical and dental
expenses.

Tne custodial parent shall notify the non-custodici

parent TTithin a reasonable time of any such incurred expenses for
which she desires reimbursement.
12.

The father's total child support obligation

includes the base child support plus his share of any nonroutine, uninsured medical and dent*;_ expenses.
13.

The father may xec?\

^ as a credit against his

base child support obligation, the child'•$ pore ion of any monthly
payments made directly by him for re^onabl^ medical and dental
insurance premiums>
14.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 62A-11-404.5, the

father's income is subject to iremediate and automatic withholding
for the payment of child support.
15.

All written verification of payment of insurance

premiums and all payments shall be made to the Office of Recovery
Services, P. 0. Box 45011, Salt LaJce City, UT

84145, unless ths

Office gives written notice that such should be sent elsewhere.
16.

Both parties are ordered to provide each other and

tiie State of Utah with notice of any 10% change in gross monthly
income, or any change in their residence, employment, medical,
hospital and dental insurance premiums or coverage,
4

17.

In accordance with Utah Code Ann. §62A-ll-320.5,

either the father or the mother may periodically request of the
Utah Department of Human Services c, review of the child support
order entered by the court in this case.

DATED THIS

Ji

DAY OF

LAA^i^

1993.

TYRi

Dt$TRICT COURT
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